Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
1997

Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public
Schools
Jay D. Wexler
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay D. Wexler, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent
Design in the Public Schools , in 49 Stanford Law Review 439 (1997).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1630

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

Of Pandas, People, and the First
Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Teaching Intelligent Design in the
Public Schools
Jay D. Wexler*
Despite the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, striking down Arkansas' statute requiringequal time for the teaching of creationism and evolution, the debate over whether some form of creationism should be
taught in public schools has recently enjoyed a resurgence. In this note, Jay
Wexler applies the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause to a new variantof
creationism that posits the existence of an intelligent designeras an alternative
to evolution. Wexler argues that teaching intelligent design theory in the public schools violates the Establishment Clause. After explaining that the
Supreme Court has always applied the Establishment Clause with extra vigilance in the public school context, Wexler argues that intelligent design, because it posits a being who created life and seeks to answer fundamental
questions about human existence, constitutes a religious belief that cannot be
constitutionallytaught in public schools. Wexler rejects the argument that intelligent design teaches science and not religion on the grounds that whether
or not intelligent design teaches a nominally scientific theory, it still violates
the Establishment Clause by sending a forbidden message of exclusion to atheists and non-Christians. Finally, Wexler suggests that creationists and evolutionists should recognize the divisiveness caused by disputes over religion and
take steps to reduce this divisiveness both inside and outside the classroom.
INTRODUCTION

When about two hundred citizens of Piano, Texas arrived at an emotionally
charged school board meeting on the evening of February 7, 1995, many of
them were wearing buttons with a big red "X" emblazoned over the image of a
* Third-year law student, Stanford Law School. B.A., Harvard University, 1991; M.A., University of Chicago Divinity School, 1993. 1 would like to thank Professor Thomas Grey and his Legal
Studies Colloquium for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this note. I would also like to
thank the hard-working and talented editors of the Stanford Law Review. Special thanks go to Sean
Hecker, Robert Klieger, and Deborah Muns for their tireless efforts and many helpful suggestions. Finally, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Karen Tokos, whose practical insights into teaching
evolution from a biology teacher's perspective were indispensible.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:439

panda.' They wore these buttons not because they hated wildlife, but rather
because they had come to discuss whether the trustees of the Piano Independent
School District could purchase Of Pandasand People: The Central Question of
Biological Origins,2 a biology textbook that presents the theory of intelligent
design as an alternative to evolution. 3 When the meeting finally ended past
midnight on February 8, the board had voted unanimously to bar trustees from
purchasing the textbook unless specifically requested to by a district staff member,4 essentially ending the debate in Piano
over whether the book would be
5
used in the district's biology classrooms.
Religious conservatives may have lost this small battle in Piano, 6 but they
have been playing an increasingly important role in local school controversies
throughout the country. Religious conservatives sit on school boards in many
states and form a majority of the boards on many counties. 7 According to one
estimate, Christian conservatives already control over 2000 local school
boards. 8 Although much of the controversy regarding religion in the public
schools continues to focus on issues of school prayer and sex education, 9 creationist teaching has once again surfaced in these debates.' 0 In 1992, a Vermont
school board member pushed through a motion that would have required teach1. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Trustees Kill Plan to Buy Divisive Book; Piano Biology Teachers
Won't Receive Copies, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 8, 1995, at 1A, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
2. PERCIVAL DAVIS & DEAN H. KENYON, OF PANDAS AND PEOPLE: THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF
BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS (2d ed. 1993).
3. Trustees had first called for the school board to consider using the text as a supplement to the
biology curriculum. See Alexei Barrionuevo, PianoTrustee Delays Discussion of ControversialScience
Text, DALLAS MORNmG NEWS, Feb. 7, 1995, at 24A, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
Following criticism from a group called Keep Quality in Piano Schools, which depicted the book as a
veiled attempt to introduce religious dogma into the science classroom, the trustees instead asked the
board to consider buying the book so that teachers in the district could review it for possible adoption.
See id. Although a 4-member majority of the school board supported using the book as a supplement,
the board ultimately tabled the issue as too divisive. See Barrionuevo, supra note 1, at IA.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Piano residents dealt another blow to intelligent design advocates in a May 1996 school board
election. The election pitted an incumbent school-board member who opposed the use of Pandas in the
classroom against a professor at the University of Texas at Dallas who had no objections to the book.
See Stephen Power, Lines Drawn in Trustee Race; Evans, Midgley Express Few Kind Words at Forum,
DALLAS MORNING NEws, Apr. 4, 1996, at IF, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File. The
intelligent design friendly candidate lost. See Stephen Power, High Marksfor First Year; Even Superintendent's Critics Call Debut a Success, DALLAS MORNIG NEws, June 14, 1996, at 1K, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
7. See Laurel Shaper Walters, Religious Right Win Seats on School BoardsAcross the US, CurusTIAN SCt. MONrrOR, Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 (noting that conservative religious groups are waging a grassroots campaign to elect conservative candidates to community school boards); see also People for the
American Way, Attacks on the Freedom to Learn '96 (last modified Sept. 5, 1996) <http://
www.pfaw.org/attacks/httoc.htm> (tracking the involvement of the Religious Right in public education).
8. See Edward Helmore, Right Stokes New CreationistRow, INDEPEmDEr (London), July 30,
1995.
9. See Right Wing Targets Schools, Say Censorship Opponents: Prayer, Creationism, Vouchers
Cited in Survey, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Sept. 5, 1996, at 5A.
10. See id. On the general resurgence of creationism in the United States, see Colin Campbell &
Deborah Scroggins, Very Weird Science, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1995, at 70.
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ers to teach creationism. 11 In August of 1993, the Board of Education in Vista,
California voted to implement a creationism requirement as part of the science
curriculum.1 2 The school board in Louisville, Ohio urges its teachers to present

students with "altemate theories to evolution." 13 And in 1996, Alabama passed
a law requiring all biology textbooks to include a disclaimer stating that evolution is a "controversial theory" accepted by "some scientists,"' 4 while New
Hampshire considered a bill that would have made it illegal to teach evolution
without parental consent.' 5 Even where school boards and state legislatures
have not weighed in on the creationist controversy, more and more public
school teachers are opting to deal with the growing debate by teaching neither
evolution nor any alternative theories on the origins of humankind.' 6 Watchdog groups such as the National Center for Science Education in Berkeley,
California and the Americans United for Separation of Church and State continue to challenge creationists, 17 while the Christian Coalition and other groups
such as the Foundation for Thought and Ethics, the Richardson, Texas-based
group which publishes Pandas,stand firm on the other side.' 8 Both sides employ spirited rhetoric. "[S]chool science classes should remain as free from
creationism as they are from flat Earth geology,"' 9 states an opponent of Pandas. A Merrimack, New Hampshire school board member counters: "If you're
only going to teach evolution, then your God is King Kong." 20
How can teaching creationism in the public schools still be an issue despite
the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Edwards v. Aguillard?' striking down a
Louisiana statute that required teachers to give equal time to creationism and
evolution? 22 The resurgence of this debate is explained in part by the new
strategy creationists have adopted for introducing creationist ideas into the
classroom. The creation science doctrine that was popular among creationists
in the 1980s has been replaced with the theory of intelligent design, 2 3 a theory
11. See Richard Saltus, EducatorReports on Creationism,BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1993, at 36.
Fear of legal challenges prompted the quick recision of the motion. See id.
12. See David Tuller & Susan Yoachum, Evolution Debate in San Diego Suburb: School Board's
ChristianMajority Wants Creationism in the Curriculum,S.F. CHRoN., Sept. 14, 1993, at Al.
13. Kenneth R. Miller, Life's Grand Design, TEcH. REv., FeblMar. 1994, at 24, 26.
14. Michael D. Lemonick, Dumping on Darwin, TnME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 81.
15. See Ian Katz, Monkey Retrial, GuAaDaA, Apr. 11, 1996, at 2.

16.
17.
Design,"
18.
19.

See Jessica Mathews, CreationismMakes a Comeback, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 1996, at A21.
See Erik Larson, DarwinianStruggle: Instead of Evolution, a Textbook Proposes "Intelligent
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Al.
See id.
Edward E. Max, Letter to Editor, Of Pandas,People... and a Final Word on Evolution,
WASH. TrmEs, Oct. 22, 1995, at B5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
20. Bill Lambrecht, Control of Schools is "Values" Lesson in Many Elections, ST. Louis PosTDISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1995, at IA (quoting school board member Virginia Twardosky). And, during the
1996 Republican primaries, candidate Pat Buchanan momentarily thrust the creationism controversy
from the small towns and grassroots battles into the national spotlight, demanding that parents "have a
right to insist that Godless evolution not be taught to their children." Katz, supra note 15, at 2.
21. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
22. See id. at 596-97.
23. See Ben Macintyre, Darwin v. Designers: The New Strugglefor Cultural Supremacy, TIMEs
(London), Dec. 19, 1994, at 7 (pointing to creationism's reemergence with renewed vigor in the form of
intelligent design); Miller, supra note 13, at 25 (calling intelligent design a "new movement ... to
counter the scientifically accepted theory that living organisms evolved to their present forms").
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that has its roots in William Paley's classic work Natural Theology24 and that
has been thrust into the modem debate by Of Pandas and People.25 Simply
put, proponents of intelligent design argue that the world and its creatures are
far too complex to have arisen through random patterns of evolution and must
be the product of some intelligent designer. To use a common example drawn
from Paley's work, if we were to come across a stone on a beach we might
reasonably believe that the stone had lain on the beach forever. However, if we
were to come across a watch on the beach, we could only reasonably conclude
that someone had designed the watch. 26 Like the watch, such complex natural
phenomena as the human eye, the bat's sonar system, the bee's colony, and the
spider's web are so intricate and perfect that an intelligent designer must have
created them.27 Because intelligent design theory does not necessarily rely on
any particular conception of the designer and does not require belief in any
particular biblical story, such as the six-day creation 28 or great flood, 29 intelligent design theory is put forth as science, not religion, and thus as a worthy
complement to evolution in the classroom. Of Pandasand People reflects just
this position.

3°

Two biologists, Percival Davis and Dean H. Kenyon, wrote Pandas in
The Foundation for Thought and Ethics published a second, and more
widely distributed, version in 1993. The book critiques evolutionary explanations for the origin of life, genetics, the fossil record, and macroevolution, at
each step positing that the theory of intelligent design better explains natural
phenomena than evolution does. However, the book mentions no biblical story
1989.31

24. W~mxAm PALEY, NATURAL THEoLoGY (New York, Harper & Brothers 1845).
25. See, e.g., Alexei Barrionuevo, Science Book Creating Dissent; Piano Considering Text that
Foes Criticizeas Dogma; Backers Say it Balances Evolution, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Jan. 12, 1995, at
IA, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (reporting criticism of Pandasas "a thinly disguised
version of creationism"); Tim Beardsley, Darwin Denied: Opponents of Evolution Make Gains in
Schools, Sci. AM., July 1995, at 12 (describing intelligent design as a "new weapon" in the creationist
arsenal); Joan Biskupic, Justices' Reach Extends to Biology Lessons: Ruling on Teaching Creationism
Has Quieted Battle as Schools Drop Subject to Avoid Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1993, at A3
(describing the endurance of the creation-science debate); Larson, supra note 17, at Al (labeling the
book "either an unflinching scientific look at flaws in evolutionary theory or the advance wedge of a
new effort to return old-time religion to U.S. schools").
26. 1 PALEY, supra note 24, at 37-38:
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my feet against a stone, and were asked how the stone
came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain
there for ever .... But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be
inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer
which I had before given, that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been
there.... [W]hen we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in
the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose ....
Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
27. For a discussion of natural complexity by a fervent critic of Paley, see RIcHARD DAWKcNs,
THE BLInD WATcHMAKER 1-18 (1986).
28. See Genesis 1:1-1:31.
29. See iL 7:1-7:24.
30. See DAvis & KENYoN, supra note 2, at 160-61 ("Mhe concept of design implies absolutely
nothing about beliefs normally associated with Christian fundamentalism .... All it implies is that life
had an intelligent source.").
31. See Larson, supra note 17, at Al. The status of the authors as biologists has been controversial, given their religious backgrounds and agenda. See text accompanying notes 112-121 infra.
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or other particular conception of the creator. The authors only go so far as to
say that "life, like a manufactured object, is the result of intelligent shaping of
matter." 32 The book also refuses to reject explicitly evolution and instead invites students to make up their own minds about the origin of species. As the
authors say in the introduction: "By now you are aware
that you have a mind
'' 33
of your own. Here is a good opportunity to use it.
Apparently, many students throughout the country have received this invitation. Jon Buell, the book's publisher, claims that more than 22,000 copies of
the book are in print and that sales have been made to teachers and curriculum
designers in forty-eight states.34 He also claims that at least fifteen school districts have ordered enough books to indicate that they are using them in the
classroom, 3 5 though Buell refuses to reveal where these school districts are
located. 36 They are most likely not in Idaho, a state which rejected the book
after heated controversy in 1993. 37 They might be in Alabama. When the
book was introduced there that same year, supporters, including Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum, presented the state textbook committee with a petition
signed by over 11,000 people endorsing intelligent design. 38 They might also
be in Ohio. In September 1994, residents of Louisville, Ohio voted to urge the
local school board to adopt the book as a supplement to the teaching of evolution, 39 and the school district has accepted a donation of between 100 and 150
copies.4 0 Other school districts in Ohio and Washington have also at least con41
sidered purchasing Pandas.
But the question remains: Is teaching intelligent design in public school
classrooms constitutional? The authors, of course, claim that it is. In fact, the
authors devote eight pages to arguing that the book espouses a valid scientific
theory that may, under the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards, be constitutionally taught in public schools as an alternative to evolution. 42 The authors
attempt to counter the conception of evolution as fact or science and the opposite conception of intelligent design as religion. In the closing passages of the
book, the authors argue that the teaching of Pandas does not violate the First
Amendment:
A final misconception you may encounter is that intelligent design is simply
sectarian religion. According to this view, intelligent design is merely fundamentalism with a new twist; teaching it in public schools allegedly violates the
separation of church and state.
This view is wide of the mark. The idea that life had an intelligent source
is hardly unique to Christian fundamentalism. Advocates of design have in32. DAvis & KENYo-4, supra note 2, at vii.

33. Id at ix.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Larson, supra note 17, at Al.
id
Beardsley, supra note 25, at 12.
Larson, supra note 17, at Al.
id
id.

40. See Beardsley, supra note 25, at 12.
41. See Lemonick, supra note 14, at 81.
42. See DAvis & KENYoN4, supra note 2, at 153-61.
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cluded not only Christians and other religious theists, but pantheists, Greek and
Enlightenment philosophers and now include many modem scientists who describe themselves as religiously agnostic. Moreover, the concept of design implies absolutely nothing about beliefs normally associated with Christian
fundamentalism, such as a young earth, a global flood, or even the existence
of
43
the Christian God. All it implies is that life had an intelligent source.
Not surprisingly, evolutionists do not share this attitude toward intelligent
design. Many critics of creationism, such as Raymond Vasvari of the ACLU
and Eugenie Scott of the National Center for Science Education, have spoken
out against the book and the theory. 44 It seems inevitable that the dispute over
Pandaswill eventually reach the American judicial system. Scott predicts that
"[s]ooner or later we are going to have to go to court over Pandas."45 Observes another commentator, "[g]iven the depth of feeling on both sides, perhaps nine important6 justices in Washington had better start reading up on
'4
intelligent design.
This note argues that teaching the intelligent design theory of Pandasin the
public schools violates the First Amendment. Under the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, teaching intelligent design in public schools
constitutes an inappropriate endorsement of religious belief, rather than simply
the communication of an alternative scientific theory. The note proceeds in
four Parts. Part I briefly relates the history of creationism in the United States
and its treatment by American courts. Part II describes Pandasand the intelligent design theory it espouses. Part I explores the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, with particular attention to the public school
context, and posits alternative reasons why Pandasespouses a religious viewpoint that cannot be taught in public schools. Part IV takes up the question of
whether Pandasqualifies as science and determines that this question is constitutionally irrelevant. Finally, the note concludes with a critique of some evolutionists' antireligious agendas and urges the reconciliation of religion and
evolution outside of the public school classroom.
I.

CREATIONISM IN AMERICA

Although the intelligent design theory espoused in Pandasrepresents a new
line of attack against evolutionary biology, it is but the latest chapter in a long
tradition of creationist thought that began shortly after Darwin published his
Origin of Species47 in 1859 and that has been the source of considerable social
and judicial strife ever since. 48 The social meaning of Pandasrelates closely to
43.
44.
45.
46.

IM. at 161 (footnotes omitted).
See Larson, supra note 17, at Al.
Beardsley, supra note 25, at 14 (quoting Eugenie Scott).
Id. at 14.

47. CHARL.ES DARwn,ON THE OIGIN OF SPECIES (photo. reprint 1964) (1859).

48. Long before Darwin, the idea that the complexity of life's creatures proved the existence of
God captivated many theologians, including St. Thomas Aquinas, whose "fifth way" of proving the
existence of God was an early version of the intelligent design theory. See ST. THOMAS AQtnNAs,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA 14 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc., Am.
ed. 1947) (1920) ("[T]hings which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end .... Now
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its historical roots and necessitates a review of the history of creationist thought
over the last century.
The publication of Darwin's magnum opus forced religious leaders and
scientists to reexamine their traditional beliefs. Many found some way to reconcile evolution with their religious beliefs." 9 Devoted Christian scientists
found numerous ways to reconcile evolution with a belief in God, including an
understanding of evolution as divinely guided or a reading of each "day" of
Genesis as a single epoch in cosmic history.50 Even religious leaders did not
insist on denying, at least in print, that the earth was millions of years old or
that the fossil record revealed a natural progression; 5 1 some even believed that
52
evolution proved the existence of God.
Not until the 1920s did Christian conservatives, led by William Jennings
Bryan, begin to seriously attack evolution in the public sphere.5 3 Because of
the early acceptance of evolution by scientists, high school biology textbooks
before Bryan generally presented evolution in a favorable light.5 4 But scientific difficulty in reconciling Darwinian evolution with newly rediscovered
Mendelian genetics 55 and the increasing hostility of rural America toward the
industrialized and urbanized Northeast, where evolution was most widely accepted, 56 fueled Bryan's attack on evolution during the early 1920s. 57 Bryan
was a natural leader of the growing movement against evolution. A strict Presbyterian, Bryan believed passionately that evolution was not only a flawed explanation for the origin of man, but also a dangerous one.5 8 He began his
nationwide crusade against evolution in 1921 with his lecture "The Menace of
Darwinism." His presentations employed an argument very similar to that of
whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed
with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.") For the classic attack
on this argument, see DAVID Htr~m, DIALOGUEs CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION 174-94 (Norman
Kemp Smith ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1935) (1779). For historical discussions of intelligent design, see
JOHN HICK, ARGUMENTs FOR THE E-XIsMNCE OF GOD 1-36 (1971) and THOMAS McPHERSON, THE ARGUNMENrFRo

DESIGN 1-14 (1972).

49. See RONALD L. NuNtBERs, THE CEAoNsTs: THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIc CEATIOisM 319 (1992) (describing reactions to evolution in the years following the publication of On The Origin of

Species).
50. See id.
at 10-13, 17; Sidney Ratner, Evolution and the Rise of the Scientific Spirit in America,
in SCIENCE AND CREATIONISm 398, 405-06 (Ashley Montagu ed., 1984).
51. See NUMBERS, supra note 49, at 17.
52. See John R. Cole, Scopes and Beyond: Antievolutionism and American Culture,in SCmrNnsTs
CONFRONT CP-ATIONISM 13, 19 (Laurie R. Godfrey ed., 1983) (reporting that leading northeastern religious leaders in the nineteenth century praised evolution as "a remarkable proof of God's wisdom"); see
also JON H. ROBERTS, DARwINIsM ND THE DrvNE IN AMERICA: PROTEsTANT INTELLECTUALs AND
ORGANIC EVOLUTN, 1859-1900, at 81-87, 117-45 (1988) (describing evolution's acceptance among
religious leaders after 1865 and its theologic implications).
53. See NUmBERS, supra note 49, at 41.
54. See id.
at 39; Edward J. Larson, Before the Crusade: Evolution in American Secondary Educa-

tion Before 1920, 20 J. HIsT. BIOLOGY 89 (1987).

55. See Cole, supra note 52, at 18; see also NuMBERS, supranote 49, at 38 (noting late nineteenth
and early twentieth century skepticism of Darwinian evolution); cf.id.at 38 (arguing that in light of
these attacks on Darwinism, many antievolutionists began to suspect that liberal Christians had been too
quick to embrace evolution).
56. See Cole, supra note 52, at 16-18.
57. See id.
58. See NummERs,supra note 49, at 41-44.
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modem intelligent design proponents, namely, that the eye is too complex to
have emerged from random patterns of evolution alone:5 9
The evolutionist guesses that there was a time when eyes were unknown-that
is a necessary part of the hypothesis.... [A] piece of pigment, or, as some say,
a freckle appeared upon the skin of an animal that had no eyes. This piece of
pigment or freckle converged the rays of the sun upon that spot and when the
little animal felt the heat on that spot it turned the spot to the sun to get more
heat. The increased heat irritated the skin-so the evolutionists guess, 6and
a
0
nerve came there and out of the nerve came the eye! Can you beat it?

Thousands of supporters, mostly from the agrarian South, joined Bryan in
his fight against evolution. 6 1 In tandem with organizations such as the Bryan
Bible League, the Anti-Evolution League of America, and the Defenders of the
Christian Faith, Bryan made significant headway in forcing evolution out of the
public schools. 6 2 By the decade's end, more than twenty state legislatures had
debated antievolution laws, and three (Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas)
63
had passed laws prohibiting public schools from teaching evolution.
It was one of these laws, the Tennessee "Monkey Law," 64 that gave rise to
perhaps the most famous trial of the early twentieth century. John Scopes was
arrested in 1925 for teaching evolution in a Dayton, Tennessee classroom. 6 5
Scopes agreed to allow the ACLU to use his case to challenge the law,6 6 and
William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow faced off in a much publicized
68
battle of wits, 67 with most agreeing that Darrow had the better of the battle.
59. See id. at 42-43.

60.

Wnu.iAm JENNINGS BRYAN, IN His IMAGE 97-98 (1922).
61. See Cole, supra note 52, at 16. Many of Bryan's supporters opposed evolution even more
strongly than Bryan. For example, another leader of the antievolution movement posited that
[t]he honest, God-fearing taxpayers of this country need to realize the terrible, Bible-destroying, Christ-denying, soul-destroying scourge that is being spread among their children ...God
pity the fathers and mothers who will be brow-beaten and turned from their duty by these
educational high-brows, and allow themselves to be scarged into submission and subjection by
these Evolutionists and their bat-like, pussy footing apologists and defenders.
T.T.

MARTIN, HELL AND THE HIGH SCHOOLS: CHRIST OR EVOLUTION, WHIcH?

168 (1923).

62. See STEwART G. COLE, THE HISTORY OF FuNDAMENTALISM 259-80 (1931) (describing seven
antievolution organizations active in the 1920s).
63. See NuMBERs, supra note 49, at 41; see also MAYNARD SHIPLEY, THE WAR ON MODERN
SCIENCE: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FUNDAMENTALIsT ATTACKS ON EVOLUTION AND MODERNISM

370-

91 (1927) (sketching the efforts of Fundamentalists in the 1920s to expunge evolution from the schools
and urging a swift response); Maynard Shipley, Growth of the Anti-Evolution Movement, 32 CURRENT
IsT. 330, 330-31 (1930) (reviewing the Fundamentalist campaign against teaching evolution).
64. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2344-45 (Michie 1934) (repealed 1967) (making it unlawful for public
school teachers to "teach any theory that denies the story of the divine creation of man as taught in the
Bible, and to teach instead that man descended from a lower order of animals" and setting fines for
violators, respectively).
65. See Cole, supra note 52, at 14. Though Scopes claimed that he did not remember whether he
had actually taught evolution, he agreed that he must have since he had taught biology and biology is
inseparable from evolution. See id.
66. See EDwARD J. LARSON, TRIAL AND ERROR: Tim AMERICAN CONTRovRsY OVER CREATION
AND EVOLUTION 60-61 (1985).
67. For accounts of the trial, see generally L. SPRAGUE DE CAMP, THE GREAT MONKEY TRIAL
(1968); RAY GINGER, Six DAYS OR FoREvER?: TENNESSEE v. JOHN THOMAS ScoPES (1958).

68. See Cole, supra note 52, at 15 (noting that Bryan was mocked by the press, "an old statesman
reduced to a laughing-stock").
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Despite Darrow's apparent victory, Scopes was convicted and fined $100 for
his offense. 69 The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the conviction on technical grounds but was careful to note that the antievolution law was consistent
70
with principles of the Tennessee Constitution.
Perhaps because Scopes' conviction was overturned, or more likely because
of Clarence Darrow's performance at the trial, supporters of evolution believed
that the Scopes trial was a success.7 1 However, the legacy of the trial would
prove otherwise. In the years following the trial, textbook publishers, afraid of
losing sales, began eliminating or diluting their treatments of evolution. 72 Local school boards shunned texts that continued to discuss evolution openly;
"[t]he absence of controversial material, rather than scientific quality, determined book adoption by many school committees, and antievolutionists had
'73
learned to bring effective pressure on them."
The state of biology textbooks remained the same until the late 1950s, when
the Soviet launch of Sputnik caused the United States government to rethink its
entire science policy. 74 In 1959, in an effort to reinvigorate the nation's biology curriculum and to address the emerging "science gap" between the United
States and the Soviet Union, the National Science Foundation funded the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study ("BSCS") at the University of Colorado to
develop and publish high school biology textbooks. 75 In 1963-64, the BSCS
published three textbooks (dealing with cellular biology, ecology, and molecular analysis) that were thoroughly permeated by evolutionary theory.76 By
1970, nearly half of American high schools had adopted the BSCS books. 7 7
Creationists, however, launched a counterattack against the books, denouncing
them as an "attempt to ram evolution down the throats of our children." 7 8
When Texas adopted the BSCS books, local creationists united in a series of
emotional debates and persuaded the educational establishment to drop two of
the three texts. 79 Creationists realized that they needed to produce a rival textbook and, by 1970, the Creation Research Society had published a book enti69. See id. at 14.
70. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 367 (Tenn. 1927). The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed
the conviction because the Tennessee Constitution required that any fine over $50 be assessed by a jury.
See id. The court did not discuss whether the law was consistent with the U.S. Constitution.
71. See Cole, supra note 52, at 15.
72. See id. at 22; see also Judith V. Grabiner & Peter D. Miller, Effects of the Scopes Trial: Was it
a Victory for Evolutionists?, 185 ScIENcE 832, 833 (1974) ("It is easy to identify a text published in the
decade following 1925. Merely look up the word 'evolution' in the index or glossary; you almost
certainly will not find it."); Gerald Skoog, Topic of Evolution in Secondary School Biology Textbooks:
1900-1977, 63 Sci. EDuc. 621. 628 (1979) (noting infrequent references to evolution as a fact or law
between 1925 and the 1960s).
73. Cole, supra note 52, at 23.
74. See id. at 24.
75. See NUMBERS, supra note 49, at 238.
76. See Cole, supra note 52, at 24. On the BSCS project, see also LARSON, supra note 66, at 91,
95-98; DOROTHY NELKiN, THE CREATION CONTROVERSY: ScIENCE OR SCRIPTURE IN THE SCHOOLS 44-47

(1982).
77. See Cole, supra note 52, at 24.
78. NUMBERS, supra note 49, at 239 (quoting William J. Tinkle, Formation of the Creation Research Society, NAumtmsr, Spring 1966, at 26, 31 (1966)).
79. See Cole, supra note 52, at 24.
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tied Biology: A Searchfor Orderin Complexity, a creationism text that enjoyed
80
mixed success in the years following its publication.
Meanwhile, in 1968, the United States Supreme Court first considered the
constitutionality of state laws that prohibited public schools from teaching
evolution. 8 ' Arkansas' antievolution statute, passed in 1928, prohibited any
teacher in a public school from "teach[ing] the theory or doctrine that mankind
ascended or descended from a lower order of animals."'8 2 After the Little Rock
school board adopted a textbook containing a chapter on evolution in 1965,
high school biology teacher Susan Epperson realized that she was in a Catch22: either she refused to teach the chapter in violation of school policy or she
taught the chapter in violation of the antievolution statute.8 3 To solve her dilemma, Epperson sought and received a declaration from the Arkansas Chancery Court that the law was void.8 4 In a three sentence opinion, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed. 85 The United States Supreme Court reversed once
again.8 6 Relying heavily on the position that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools," ' 87 the Court invalidated the law because it was animated by a clear
purpose to promote the teachings of the Book of Genesis.88 Epperson essentially ended the movement, begun in the early 1920s, to ban evolution from the
public schools. 89
In the wake of Epperson, creationists adopted a new strategy to safeguard
the teaching of creationism in the public schools. Since the 1930s, creationists
with scientific credentials, such as geologist George McCready Price, had
sought scientific explanations and proof for the events described in Genesis.90
"Flood Geology" or "Deluge Geology," one of the most popular theories espoused by Price and his followers, posited that much of the fossil record could
be explained by a single catastrophic flood. 9 1 Creationists employed Price's
80. See BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY (John N. Moore & Harold Schultz
Slusher eds., 1970); see also NuMBERs, supra note 49, at 239-40. Thirty-five thousand volumes were
printed in the first two printings. See id. at 240. The textbook's use was approved by several state
textbook committees, including Indiana's. See id. An Indiana state court, however, later banned the
book's use in public schools. See id.

81. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
82. ARK. STAT. ANN.§§ 80-1627 to -1628 (1960) (held unconstitutional in Epperson, 393 U.S. at

109). By 1968, only Arkansas and Mississippi still had antievolution statutes in force. See Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 6798-99 (1942) (held unconstitutional in Smith v. State, 242 So. 2d 692, 698 (Miss. 1970)).
83. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 100.

84. See id. The Chancery Court's opinion was not officially reported.
85. See State v. Epperson, 416 S.W.2d 322 (Ark. 1967).
86. See Epperson, 393 U.S. at 109.
87. Id at 104 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).

88. See id. at 107-09. The Court explained: "[Tihere is no doubt that the motivation for the law
was the same [as in Scopes]: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it was thought, 'denied' the
divine creation of man." Id. at 109. In reaching this determination, the Court focused on an advertisement used during the campaign to adopt the bill. The advertisement stated in part: "THE BIBLE OR
ATHEISM, WHICH? All atheists favor evolution. If you agree with atheism vote against Act No. 1. If
you agree with the Bible vote for Act No. ." Id at 108 n.16.
89. See LARsON, supra note 66, at 119-20.
90. See NumErs,supra note 49, at 72-101.
91. See GEORGE McCR.ADY PRicE, EVOLUTIONARY GEOLOGY AND THE NEw CATASrROPlSM
222-23 (1926) ("By ...methods of strict inductive science, we shall not be able to avoid the conclusion
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scientific discourse to couch the teachings of Genesis in the language of science. The most important work of this era, a high school biology textbook by
Henry Morris, 92 a leader of the creationist movement for much of the late twen-

tieth century, 93 presented creationism in scientific, rather than biblical, terms.
Together with new statutes in Arkansas and Louisiana that required equal classroom time for evolution and creation science, 94 this textbook marked a new
milestone in the creationism movement.
By the mid-1970s the advocates of flood geology ... had securely attached the
synonymous tags "creation science" and "scientific creationism" to the Biblebased views of George McCready Price. This relabeling reflected more than
euphemistic preference; it signified a major tactical shift among strict six-day
creationists. Instead of denying evolution its scientific credentials, as biblical
creationists had done for a century, the scientific creationists granted creation
and evolution equal scientific standing. Instead of trying to bar evolution from
the classroom, as their predecessors had done in the 1920s, they fought to bring
creation into the schoolhouse and repudiated the epithet "antievolutionist." Instead of appealing to the authority of the Bible ...they downplayed the95Genesis story in favor of emphasizing the scientific aspects of creationism.
It was not long before this new strategy was tested in federal court. Two
months after the 1981 passage of Arkansas' equal time statute, numerous individuals and groups challenged the constitutionality of the law. 96 In McClean v.
Arkansas Board of Education, District Court Judge Overton applied the threethat our world has witnessed an awful aqueous catastrophe, and that back of this lies a direct and real
creation as the only possible origin of the great families of plants and animals."); see also GEORGE
McCREADY PmicE, THE NEw GEOLOGY 24-25 (1923):
[J]ust as a coroner may, by unmistakable evidence, be compelled to believe, in spite of himself, that something out of the ordinary has happened and that a murder or a suicide has been
committed, so may the geologist be compelled, by cogent evidence, to believe that the ancient
deposits in the earth were not laid down in the quiet, regular manner in which beds of clay,
sand, and gravel are now being formed, but that something of a wholly abnormal nature must
have taken place in the past.
l One of Price's most often used examples was the mummified Siberian elephants, which had been
frozen so suddenly their flesh could still be eaten. This phenomenon proved that
a once beautiful world, well stocked with an amazing variety of plants and animals, was at
some time in the long ago overtaken by a sudden and horrible world convulsion, the results of
which we now have spread out over all the continents, in the form of the major part of the
stratified deposits ....
Id. at 681.
92. HENRY M. MORRIS, INST. FOR CREATIrVE REsEARCH, ScIarNiC CREa-nONisM (1974).
93. See NuMBERS, supra note 49, at 192-213 (describing Morris' much publicized attempts to
reconcile the conflict between evolution and creationism through flood geology).
94. ARK.STAT. ANN.§§ 80-1663 to -1670 (Michie Supp. 1981) (forbidding the teaching of evolution in public elementary or secondary schools unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of "creation science") (held unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255
(E.D. Ark. 1982)); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982) (same) (held unconstitutional in
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)).
95. NUMBERS, supra note 49, at 242.
96. Plaintiffs included the resident Arkansas Bishops of the United Methodist, Episcopal, Roman
Catholic, and African Methodist Episcopal Churches; parents of minor children attending Arkansas public schools; a high school biology teacher, several Jewish organizations; the National Association of
Biology Teachers; and other individuals and organizations. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1257.
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part Lemon test, 97 articulated a decade earlier in Lemon v. Kurtzman,98 and
struck down the law. To pass Establishment Clause scrutiny, a statute "must
have a secular legislative purpose," a principal effect that "neither advances nor
inhibits religion," and it "must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "99 Judge Overton, in a rigorous opinion that analyzed the
history of creationism, the events culminating in passage of the Arkansas act,
and the allegedly scientific nature of creation science, held that the Act violated
each prong of the Lemon test. 100
Around the time of McLean, creationists and evolutionists alike prepared
for the inevitable court battles ahead. The years following McLean saw the
publication by scientists of several volumes defending evolution in language
that nonscientists could comprehend. 0 1 These works addressed nearly all of
the creationists' arguments, including their attacks on fossil evidence l02 and
molecular evidence, 10 3 as well as their contention that evolutionary theory violates the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 1' 4 Philosophers of.science, energized by Judge Overton's decision, also inserted themselves into the
discussion.' 0 5 In short, the debate over creationism and evolution between McLean and 1987, when the Supreme Court struck down Louisiana's equal time
97. See id. at 1258, 1264-72.
98. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99. iL at 612-13.

100. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272. With respect to the legislative purpose of the Act, the
outspoken views of the drafter and legislative sponsor of the bill, when combined with the hurried
process under which the bill was enacted, demonstrated that the bill was motivated by a clear sectarian
purpose. See id. at 1260-64. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Overton cited Epperson for the proposition that "[i]n determining the legislative purpose of a statute, courts may consider evidence of the
historical context of the Act," id. at 1263, and argued that the official history of Arkansas on the subject
of evolution belied an improper legislative purpose, id.
at 1264.
With respect to the effects prong of the Lemon test, Judge Overton relied on testimony and his own
analysis of the statute in concluding that creation science was not science, but religion, and that the Act
must therefore have the primary effect of promoting religion. See id. at 1264-72. In making this determination, Judge Overton relied upon the testimony of philosopher of science Michael Ruse to articulate
five criteria by which he could determine whether creation science was truly science. According to
Overton, science is guided by and explained by reference to natural law, is empirically testable, and is
both falsifiable and tentative; creation science met none of these criteria. See id. at 1267-68.
Finally, with regard to the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon, Judge Overton explained that
"[the need to monitor classroom discussion in order to uphold the Act's prohibition against religious
instruction will necessarily ....create an excessive and prohibited [government] entanglement with
religion." Id. at 1272.
101. See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CASE FOR EvoLUTION (1983); SciENCE AND CREATIONISM,supra note 50; SciNnsTs CoNmoNT CREAONISM, supra note 52.
102. See L. Beverly Halstead, Evolution-The Fossils Say Yes!, in SCmNCE AND CREAriONISM,
supra note 50, at 240, 240-54.
103. See Thomas H. Jukes, Molecular Evidence for Evolution, in ScNinsTs CoNRoNT CREATIONISM, supra note 52, at 117, 117-38.
104. See John W. Patterson, Thermodynamics and Evolution, in ScIEN'IST CONFRONT CREATIONISM, supra note 52, at 99, 99-116.
105. See, e.g., PmiLIP Krrcrmp, ABUSING ScIENCE: Tim CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM 44 (1982)

(attacking reliance on falsifiability as "hopelessly flawed"). Philosopher Larry Laudan strongly criticized the claim in McClean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), that
there could be any strict demarcation between science and other fields of inquiry. See Larry Laudan,
Commentary on Ruse: Science at the Bar-Causesfor Concern, in CREATIONISM, SCIENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 161, 161-66 (Marcel C. La Follette ed., 1983). But cf., Michael Ruse,
Response to Laudan's Commentary: Pro Judice, in CREAIONmSM, SciENcE, AND Trm LAW: THE ARKAN-
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statute in Edwards, was probably the most prodigious since the publication of
the Origin of Species itself.

In contrast to the complex decision in McLean, the Supreme Court's decision in Edwards was relatively straightforward and avoided the controversial
scientific analysis of the Arkansas case. The majority rested its decision
largely on the purpose prong of the Lemon test, looking behind the legislature's
stated goal of promoting academic freedom in order to discern a true legislative
purpose of promoting the teachings of the Bible. 10 6 Justice Brennan's opinion
looked to the legislative history of the Act and to broad historical contexts in
order to identify the legislature's genuine purpose.10 7 The Court took special
notice of the uniqueness of the coercive secondary school setting, arguing that
the Lemon test must be applied more stringently in the context of a high school
classroom.10 8 Despite Justice Scalia's caustic dissent, stridently attacking both
the purpose prong of Lemon and its application by the majority, 10 9 Edwards
sounded the death knell for equal time statutes and for the vigorous debate over
creationism that had flourished during the preceding decade.
Recently, however, the debate has been stirred up once again. Creationists
and evolutionists have faced off in the popular and academic press. 110 Creationism has returned to the forefront of local school board campaigns. 1 ' And
creationists have adopted a new strategy, in the form of intelligent design thesAs CASE, supra, at 167, 167-73 (defending McClean on the ground that the law demanded a more strict
definition of science than Laudan would allow).
Creationists also employed ideas drawn from the philosophy of science to support their claim that
creationism should be taught in schools, arguing that Karl Popper's falsifiability test either proved that
creation science was a science or that evolution was not, or invoking Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigms to argue that the lack of general acceptance of creationism by mainstream scientists should not
disqualify creation science as a true science. See NUMBERs, supra note 49, at 246-47.
106. See 482 U.S. at 585-94.
107. See id at 590.
There is a historic and contemporaneous link between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution. It was this link that concerned the Court in Epperson .... Although the Arkansas anti-evolution law did not explicitly state its predominant
religious purpose, the Court could not ignore that "[t]he statute was a product of the upsurge
of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor" that has long viewed this particular scientific theory as
contradicting the literal interpretation of the Bible.
Id. at 590 (footnotes and citations omitted).
108. See id. at 583-85.
109. See id at 610-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110. Law professor Phillip E. Johnson started much of this debate with his 1991 book Darwin on
Trial. His book attracted much press, both positive and negative. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Fossils and
Fallacies,NAT. RPv., Apr. 29, 1991, at 47 ("The very cogency of [Johnson's] arguments ensures that
the mainstream press will greet his book with silence."); Jerry Carroll, The Man Who Dares To Doubt
Darwin, S.F. CHRoN., June 14, 1991, at B3 (discussing Johnson's attack on Darwinian evolution); Stephen Jay Gould, Impeaching a Self-Appointed Judge, Sci. AM., July 1992, at 118, 119 ('The book, in
short, is full of errors, badly argued, based on false criteria, and abysmally written."); Phillip E. Johnson,
Can 80% of Us Be Dead Wrong?, L.A. Tmams, Aug. 17, 1993, at Al1 ("Teaching the difference between
philosophy and science isn't creationism; it's good critical thinking."). The recent publication of Darwin's Black Box, a critique of Darwinian evolution from a biochemical perspective, seems well positioned to attract comparable attention. MicHAEL J. BaEH, D~Aw's BLACK Box: THm BiocHmIMcAL
CHALLENGE TO EVOLTION

(1996).

111. See text accompanying notes 1-20 supra.
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ory, to attack evolution. It is in this context that the constitutional analysis of
Pandas must begin.
Uf.

OFPANDAS AND

PEOPLE

Although the authors of Pandas present the book as an integral part of a
balanced consideration of the origins of life, 112 the authors and publishers of
the book have a clear religious agenda. Dean Kenyon, one of the book's two
authors, has, since the late 1970s, published in creationist journals and lectured
13
about creationism in his biology classes at San Francisco State University.
In 1986, he helped support Louisiana state officials in Edwards.114 His coauthor, Percival Davis, is the coauthor of Case for Creation,1 5 a book published by an affiliate of the Chicago-based Moody Bible Institute. When asked
about his motivations for writing Pandas,he is quite honest about his religious
purposes: "Of course my motives were religious," he says, "There's no question about

11
it." 6

Jon Buell, the publisher of Pandas,is equally explicit about his purposes.
Buell, a long-time member of the Campus Crusade for Christ, began pitching
Pandasin the mid-1980s. 1 7 Buell found a small press to publish the book and
promised all contributors to Pandasthat they would receive an enameled box
with a panda on the lid, which, Buell told them, "will become a pleasant reminder to pray for our work." 8 After initial efforts to promote Pandas directly to school boards failed, Buell promoted the book at the grass-root level,
appealing to individual biology teachers to join his "quiet army" against the
metaphysical naturalism of other biology textbooks." 9 In a letter written directly to biology teachers, Buell wrote, "If you would like to be part of this
quiet army, please let us know right away."' 20 Those who chose not to join, he
wrote, "may wish to support those who do by their prayers."' 12
On the very first page of Pandas,the authors reprint the following quotation from Carl Sagan:
We live in an extraordinary age.... As long as there have been human beings,
we have posed the deep and fundamental questions, which evoke wonder and
stir us into at least a tentative and trembling awareness, questions on the origins of consciousness; life on our planet; the beginnings of the Earth; the formation of the Sun; the possibility of intelligent beings somewhere up there in
112. See DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 2, at viii.
113. See Laura Kurtzman, Faculty Backs Scientist Who Says Life Had IntelligentDesigner, DALLAS MORNING Naws, Jan. 16, 1994, at 8A, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
114. See id.
115. WAYNE FRAut & PEIcivAL DAviS, A CASE FOR CREATION (3d rev. ed. 1983).
116. Larson, supra note 17, at Al (quoting Percival Davis).

117. See id.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (quoting Jon Buell).
See Helmore, supra note 8, at 15.
Larson, supra note 17, at Al (quoting Jon Buell).
Id. (quoting Jon Buell).
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the depths of the sky; as well as, the grandest
inquiry of all-on the advent,
122
nature and ultimate destiny of the universe.
Picking up on Sagan's quotation, the authors raise similar questions, thereby
signaling to the reader that the work will explore the meaning of the universe
and the role of human beings in it:
Carl Sagan, one of the foremost popularizers of science in our time, has drawn
our attention to ancient, important, and fascinating questions. How did this
immense universe come into existence? How did the earth come to harbor
life? What does it all mean, if anything, and how do mere mortals like ourselves fit into the overall scheme of things, if indeed there be a scheme? As
Dr. Sagan
reminds us, we are not the first to wonder, nor are we likely to be the
123
last.

The authors then suggest two mutually exclusive explanations for the origins of
life, namely evolution and intelligent design.1 24
The rest of the book is devoted to casting doubt on evolutionary theory and
concurrently promoting intelligent design. The authors state:
Pandas gives students a much-needed opportunity to explore the evidence and
arguments that have caused some scientists to doubt contemporary Darwinism
Going a step further, Pandashelps students understand the positive case for
intelligent design .... [Tihe authors argue that life not only appears to have
been intelligently designed but that it actually was. 125
Pandas is divided into an overview chapter and six large chapters, each
dealing with a different topic in evolutionary theory. The overview chapter
simply summarizes the material presented in the following chapters,' 26 and the
six subsequent chapters deal with, respectively, the origin of life,' 27 genetics
and macroevolution, 28 the origin of species, 129 the fossil record, 130 homology, 13 1 and biochemical similarities. 132 Each chapter presents the Darwinian
interpretation of empirical data followed by arguments seeking to discredit that
interpretation in favor of intelligent design. The book contains no mention of
the word "God" or "Creator." There is also no mention of any specifically
biblical account of the origin of life. The book does not preach, and it consistently suggests that there are two competing, at least somewhat reasonable, in122. DAVIS & KENYON, supranote 2, at vii (quoting CARL SAGAN, BRoCA's BRAn: REFLECTIONS
ON THE RoMANcF OF ScmcE xiii (1974)).

123. ME
124. See id.
125. Ma at 157; see also id. at ix ("Of Pandasand People is not intended to be a balanced treatment by itself. We have given a favorable case for intelligent design and raised reasonable doubt about
natural descent.").
126. See id. at 1-40.
127. See id. at 41-58.
128. See id at 59-76.
129. See id. at 77-90.
130. See id. at 91-113.
131. See id. at 115-34.
132. See id. at 135-48.
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terpretations of the biological data. The book does, however, strongly advocate
13 3
the idea that life was created by an intelligent agent, not simply evolution.
For the most part, the authors of the book are engaged in a familiar project.
Like most creationists before them, they concern themselves primarily with
raising doubts about Darwinian evolution. The book is unique only insofar as it
postulates that an unnamed intelligent agent, rather than a particularly Christian
God, created the world and its creatures. 134 Even the claim that the belief in a
creator is scientifically warranted derives from traditional creationism. The
creation science movement of the 1970s and 1980s, which culminated in Edwards, was based almost exclusively on the tenet that the events of the Bible
could be supported by scientific investigation. 135 Pandas breaks new ground
not in its methodology but only in its conclusion that some intelligent agent, not
necessarily God, created the world.
But who or what is this intelligent agent and what are his, her, or its characteristics? Although the authors claim that the specifics of intelligent design
theory are open to various interpretations and further research, 136 the book
presents an agent who looks very much like the God of the Bible. He, she, or it
139
is a "designer"' 137 who devised a blueprint or plan,' 38 created organisms,
made fully formed creatures, 140 designed and formed life on earth,' 4 1 "coordi42
nate[d] the design requirements of multifunctional adaptational packages,"'
shaped matter,' 43 ordered pieces into a coherent whole, 144 and may be assumed
to have had good reasons for making decisions and to have used a variety of
design approaches.' 45 The designer is supernatural,' 4 6 a "master intellect,"' 47
and a "consummate engineer. '' 4 8 Moreover, the designer acts in ways that
humans do not understand.' 49 It is this God-like nature of the postulated intelligent designer that compels the conclusion that Pandas teaches religion, not
science, and thus, cannot be taught in American public schools.
133. See, e.g., id. at 148 ("Any view or theory of origins must be held in spite of unsolved
problems .... However, without exaggeration, there is impressive and consistent evidence, from each
area we have studied, for the view that living things are the product of intelligent design.").
134. See id. at 161 ("[The concept of design implies absolutely nothing about... the existence of
the Christian God. All it implies is that life had an intelligent source.").
135. See NUMBERS, supra note 49, at 241-57 (describing the creation science and scientific crea-

tionism movement).
136. See DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 2, at 126.

137. See id. at 125.
138. See id. at 14.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 25-26.
141. See id. at 41.
142. Id. at 72.

143. See id. at 78.
144. See id. at 144.
145. See id. at 125.

146. See id. at 7. Although the authors do not use the word "supernatural," by placing the theory
of intelligent cause in counterdistinction to natural causes and by arguing that an intelligent designer can

do things that could not be accomplished through natural causes, they clearly imply a supernatural
designer.

147. Id. at 58.
148. Id. at 71.
149. See id. at 125.

January 1997]

PANDAS, PEOPLE,AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
III.

455

WHY PANDAS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

There are several problems with attempting to discern what the Supreme
Court1 50 would or should do if faced with adjudicating the constitutionality of
teaching Pandas in the public schools. It is not a stretch to describe the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence as both confusing and unpredictable. 151 The decline of the Lemon test, the test that the Court had once
put forward as the "Grand Unified Theory" of the Establishment Clause,1 52 and
the diverging emphases in cases arising under the Establishment Clause1 53 help
account for this disarray. In short, it is quite challenging to predict exactly
what the Court will do when faced with any particular Establishment Clause
problem.
This problem is compounded by uncertainty over the posture and context in
which a challenge to Pandaswould arise. In both Edwards and Epperson, the
Court relied on the particular events, characters, language, and context surrounding the passage of the laws in question.1 54 Here, of course, these facts do
not yet exist, with the important exception that we do know quite a bit about the
motivations of the authors and publishers of the book. Presumably, a challenge
to intelligent design could arise in response to a school board's decision to
adopt the book as part of its regular curriculum or by a teacher seeking to teach
the book against school wishes on academic freedom grounds. Either way,
important facts will have to be filled in before a completely accurate prediction
of the Court's resolution can be made.
Despite the lack of specific facts, the language of Pandasitself and context
in which it has arisen are sufficient to compel the conclusion that teaching
150. Or a lower court attempting to follow what the Supreme Court would do.
151. See Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal,23 HOFSTRA L. REv.
309, 311 (1994) (collecting various commentators' descriptions of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence as a "doctrinal quagmire," "schizophreni[c]," "inconsistent and unprincipled," "a mess,"
and "a conceptual disaster area"); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,
59 U. Ca. L. REv. 115, 120 (1992) (calling Religion Clause jurisprudence "a mess").
152. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498-99
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that the Religion Clauses cannot be reduced to a single test
or a "Grand Unified Theory," as Lemon and its progeny attempt); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the Lemon test and the Court's "embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence"); McConnell, supra note 151, at 128-30 (arguing that the
Lemon test frustrates the goals of the First Amendment and devalues religious exercise); Michael A.
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NoTRE D~hm L. REv. 311, 315-17 (1986) (arguing that the Lemon test "is
premised on an underlying view of the establishment clause which is both historically unjustified and
textually incoherent"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. R-s. L. REv. 795, 800-13
(1993) (summarizing the various attacks on the Lemon test).
153. See Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2498-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[S]etting forth a unitary test for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than
good ....
... I think it is more useful to recognize the relevant concerns in each case on their own
terms, rather than trying to squeeze them into language that does not really apply to them....
... [The Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to
a single test. There are different categories of Establishment Clause cases, which may call for
different approaches.
Id. at 2499.
154. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589-94; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968).
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Pandas in any public school scenario would be unconstitutional. Moreover,
despite its muddled Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has consistently applied the most exacting scrutiny in the context of public schools' 55 and
would surely strike down any attempt to communicate a religious belief in the
public school classroom.
A.

Schools are Special

Despite the Court's often wavering and perhaps inconsistent results in dealing with the Establishment Clause, 156 in the seven cases in which the Court has
considered the compulsory public school forum, it has consistently struck down
the offending law as a violation of the First Amendment.' 57 The Court has
given at least four separate rationales for applying the Establishment Clause
with extra vigilance in the public school context. First, and asserted most often
in early cases, is the indispensability of constitutional rights in the public
schools, which the Court has conceived of as the bedrock of a free democratic
society.1 58 "Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government. It is therefore
understandable that the constitutional prohibitions encounter their severest test
when they are sought to be applied in the school classroom."' 5 9 Second, the
Court argues that the uniquely impressionable nature of young children and
adolescents and their susceptibility to religious teaching in the classroom justifies special vigilance. 160 Third, the Court makes special note of the compulsory nature of secondary and elementary school attendance. Since students are
155. See text accompanying notes 157-165 infra.
156. See McConnell, supranote 151, at 119 ("With doctrine in such chaos, the Warren and Burger
Courts were free to reach almost any result in almost any case.").
157. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (disallowing prayer as part of an official

public school graduation ceremony); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 596-97 (invalidating law that prohibited the
teaching of evolution without accompanying instruction in creation science); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (rejecting Alabama statute authorizing one-minute period of silence "for meditation
or voluntary prayer" in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1980) (striking Kentucky
law requiring posting of the Ten Commandments in each public school classroom); Epperson, 393 U.S.
at 109 (invalidating Arkansas "anti-evolution" statute); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
224 (1963) (striking Pennsylvania law requiring reading of Bible passages at start of school day); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (rejecting law requiring recitation of official prayer in New York
public schools). When the Court has considered contexts where attendance is not mandatory or where
the students in question are college students and not high school or elementary school students, the
results have been different. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
394-97 (1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause is not violated when a school district is compelled, under free speech principles, to allow after-school use of its facilities by a church group);
Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (ruling unconstitutional the University of Missouri at
Kansas City's exclusion of student religious groups from university meeting places).
158. See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104-105 (extolling the importance of safeguarding constitutional guarantees in public schools); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting popular
regard for public schools as a "vital civic institution" intimately tied to the preservation of democracy).
159. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 241-42 ("It is implicit in
the history and character of American public education that the public schools serve a uniquely public
function: the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist
").
influence of any sort ....
160. See, e.g., Edwards,482 U.S. at 584 (noting the status of teachers as role models and susceptibility of students to peer pressure); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
('This Court's [Fist Amendment] decisions have recognized a distinction when govemment-sponsored
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required to be in class, there is a far greater chance that they will feel coerced
into accepting whatever religious belief they are taught. 16 1 Moreover, the
Court has also held that a provision allowing students to excuse themselves
from the questioned portion of a class "furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause."' 162 In making this determination, the Court has relied upon psychological literature showing that children
and adolescents lack free choice to leave a setting permeated by peer pressure.163 Finally, the authoritative role of teachers in the classroom increases
the likelihood that the teaching of a religious belief will lead to coercion, rather
than simply a free exchange of ideas.164
For all these reasons, Establishment Clause scrutiny is especially exacting
in the public school context:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the
Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust
public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on
the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his
or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great authority and coercive power
through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure. Furthermore, "[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy
and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny ......
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we must do so
mindful of the particular165
concerns that arise in the context of public elementary
and secondary schools.

Given this vigilance with which the Court has policed the Establishment Clause
in the public school context, and its consistent invalidation of laws that advance
or endorse religious viewpoints in the classroom, Panda's constitutionality
turns on whether the book espouses a religious viewpoint. The next two sections argue that it does.
B.

Intelligent Design is Religion

On the final pages of Pandas,its authors argue that the book does not teach
a religious viewpoint because intelligent design implies nothing about the beliefs, such as a young earth or a global flood, that are associated with Christian
religious exercises are directed at impressionable children who are required to attend school, for then
government endorsement is much more likely to result in coerced religious beliefs.").
161. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-84 (noting the unique concerns that arise in the

mandatory elementary and secondary school environment); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 81 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the potentially coercive public school setting).
162. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
163. See id. at 290-91 & n.69 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing psychological studies).

164. See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584 (noting teachers' status as role models).
165. ld. at 583-84 (citations and footnote omitted) (first alteration in original).
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fundamentalism. 1 66 The idea that life had an intelligent source, they further
assert, is not unique to Christian fundamentalism.' 67 These arguments miss the
fact that the Court has always interpreted the Establishment Clause to prevent
not only the favoring of one religion over others, but also the favoring of religion generally over irreligion.1 68 In other words, even if Pandas does not espouse Christianity in any form, 169 teaching it will nevertheless violate the
Establishment Clause if it embodies a generally religious viewpoint that promotes any belief in religion. The question, then, is whether the belief that an
intelligent designer created the world and everything in it according to a master
plan is a religious belief.
The Supreme Court has not provided a clear, concrete, and consistently
employed definition of religion in the First Amendment context, 170 and it has
been particularly reluctant to craft such a definition with respect to the Establishment Clause.' 7 ' However, commentators do not share the Court's reluctance to discuss the constitutional meaning of religion, 172 and the Court itself
has occasionally contemplated the contours of such a definition.' 73 From these
comments and suggestions, two types of definitions of religion emerge. Substantive or content-based definitions define religion based on the substance of
166. See DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 2, at 160-61.
167. See id. at 161.
168. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2487
(1994) ("Mhe Establishment Clause compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward religion, favoring neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.")
(citation omitted); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) ("Mhe Establishment Clause forbids support for religion in general no less than support for one religion or some.");
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
169. But see text accompanying notes 214-232 infra (arguing that Pandas does, in fact, teach
Christianity).
170. See GERALD GuNTHER, CONsTrrtmoNAL LAW § 14-2, at 1586 (12th ed. 1991) ('The constitutional definition of 'religion' continues in doubt .... ").
171. See LAWRENCE H. TeIBE, AMERiCAN CoNsTrTUToNAL LAW § 14-6, at 1187 (2d ed. 1988)
("[Clourts have largely avoided defining 'religion' under the establishment clause, focusing instead on
the more important concept of 'establishment.' ").
172. See, e.g., Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 22 CuMB.
L. Rav. 1, 33-46 (1991) (proposing a definition of religion based on faith); Jesse H. Choper, Defining
"Religion" in the FirstAmendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. RaV. 579, 604-12 (considering how religion should
be defined in the Establishment Clause context); Feofanov, supra note 151, at 385-91 (proposing a
definition of religion as "a manifestly non-rational (i.e., faith-based) belief concerning the alleged nature
of the universe, sincerely held"); Richard 0. Frame, Note, Belief in a NonmaterialReality-A Proposed
FirstAmendment Definition of Religion, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 838-51 (proposing a content-based
definition of religion comprising belief in a non-material reality); George C. Freeman, m, The Misguided Searchfor the ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion," 71 Gao. L.J. 1519, 1565 (1983) (arguing
that there can be no single definition of religion); Robert L. Rabin, When is a Religious BeliefReligious:
United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CoRNELL L.Q. 231,240-44 (1966) (arguing
for a definition of religion broad enough to encompass unorthodox systems of belief); C. John Sommerville, Defining Religion and the Present Supreme Court, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 167, 177-80
(1994) (proposing a definition of religion based on tradition and expectation); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1083-86 (1978) (arguing for a bifurcated definition of religion in Religion Clause cases).
173. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340-44 (1970) (discussing a religion-based
conscientious objector claim under the Universal Military Training and Service Act); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-78 (1965) (same).
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the belief. 17 4 For example, a content-based definition might define religion as
a belief in a god. Such a definition would include Christianity but would perhaps exclude such Eastern religions as Taoism that do not rely on such a concept. 175 Functional definitions define religion not by the content of a belief, but
instead in terms of the role the belief plays in a person's life; such definitions
often stress the centrality of a belief to a given person. 176 Regardless of what
type of definition the Court would choose to apply to Pandas, however, the
intelligent design theory espoused in the book would meet either one of them.
The Framers of the Constitution and the Supreme Court in its early years
favored a content-based definition of religion, specifically belief in a supernatural creator. In his classic statement on the separation of church and state, James
Madison defined religion as "the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the
Manner of discharging it."'177 Early Court decisions echoed this characterization of religion. In an 1890 case, the Court drew heavily on Madison's view of
religion: "The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and
character, and of obedience to his wil. ' 17 8 In the 1950s, the Court characterized religion with reference to a "Supreme Being."'179 Although the growth of
nontraditional and non-Western religions has since forced the Court to expand
the range of beliefs it considers religious, 80 the belief in a supreme being and
creator still lies at the core of the meaning of religion. In Edwards, the Court
twice equates the two. In discussing the legislative purpose of the Louisiana
Creationism Act, the Court noted that "[t]he preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religiousviewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind."'' A few sentences later, the Court noted that
"[t]he legislative history... reveals that the term 'creation science,' as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the religious belief that
182
a supernaturalcreatorwas responsiblefor the creation of humankind."'
Pandasfalls under this content-based definition. To be sure, the book does
not refer83to a "supreme being" or "creator." It usually employs only the term
"agent'1 or "cause."' 84 However, the book does describe this agent as a "designer."' 8 5 Moreover, whoever or whatever this agent is, he, she, or it
174. See Feofanov, supra note 151, at 339.

175. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
176. See Feofanov, supra note 151, at 339.
177. JAMES MADISON, MEMOmAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGANST RELIGIOUS ASsESStmNTs (1785),

reprinted in THE SutRFm COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE 18, 18 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988).
178. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890).
179. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (arguing for a functional definition of religion); Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.l 1 (characterizing certain traditions, such as Taoism and
Buddhism, as religious despite their lack of belief in God).
181. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).

183. See e.g., DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 2, at 7, 14, 41, 100, 138, 158.
184. See e.g., id. at ix, 7, 26, 127.
185. See e.g., id at 125, 159, 160.
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"designed"'186 and "devised" 187 the blueprint for life, "creating"' 188 human beings and all the rest of nature. An agent who creates is surely a creator. Since
belief in a creator is at the core of the meaning of religion, Pandasis teaching a
religious belief. Since all theisms rest on a belief in someone or something that
created the universe, Pandas is in fact laying out an argument for the most
basic and most universal prerequisite of all theistic beliefs. The authors seem
to believe that by avoiding use of the word "creator" or "supreme being," they
have written a secular book. But Establishment Clause jurisprudence "reaches
past formalism." 189 One need not look far beyond the absence of these terms to
discover a supreme, supernatural being who designed, coordinated, and created
all of nature according to a master plan.
Indeed, the intelligent design theory espoused in Pandasclosely resembles
the creation science considered by the Court in Edwards, despite the authors'
contrary assertions. 190 The Edwards Court did not base its finding that the
teaching of creation science amounts to the teaching of religion on testimony
that creation science was particularly Christian, but rather on testimony that
described creation science in nearly the same terms as the intelligent design
theory of Pandas.19 1 The Court relied on the testimony of an expert on creation science that creation science simply amounts to a theory on the existence
of a supernatural creator, 192 testimony from the hearings at the introduction of
the challenged Louisiana Creation Act that described creation science as postulating- "that everything was created by some intelligence or power external to
the universe," 193 and the statement of Senator Keith, the legislative sponsor of
the Act, who characterized creation science as embodying the view "that a creator however you define a creator was responsible for everything that is in this
world."' 194 On the basis of this testimony alone, the Court determined that creation science embodied a religious viewpoint. Pandas teaches the same viewpoint and thus also teaches religion under the content-based conception of
religion expressed in Edwards.
The intelligent design theory of Pandasalso constitutes a religious belief
under any of the commonly proposed functional definitions of religion. The
Supreme Court came close to articulating a functional definition of religion in
United States v. Seeger.195 The Seeger Court interpreted section 6(j) of the
Selective Service Act of 1948,196 which granted conscientious objector status
to anyone who, on the basis of "religious training and belief," was opposed to
186. See id. at 41.
187. See id. at 14.

188. See id.
189. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992).
190. See DAVIS & KENYON, supra note 2, at 160-61 (attempting to distinguish intelligent design
from sectarian religion).

191. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591-92 (1987).
192. See id. at 591 n.12.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 591 n.13.
195. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

196. Selective Service Act of 1948, cl. 625, tit. I, § 60), 62 Stat. 609 (1948) (current version at 50
U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1994)).
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going to war. 197 The statute defined "religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being." 198 When Andrew Seeger
sought an exemption based on his "religious faith in a purely ethical creed," 1 99
the Court was called on to interpret the meaning of a "religious belief. '200 The
Court reasoned that whether a given belief qualifies as religious turns on
whether it is "sincere and meaningful" '20 1 and "occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.' 202 Then, drawing on the work of such theologians as Paul Tillich, 20 3 the Court argued that
beliefs fall within this definition if "based upon a power or being, or upon a
faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent." 2 4
The intelligent design theory of Pandaswould meet this definition because,
by its own admission, the book is concerned with addressing such fundamental
20 5 It
questions as the origins and meaning of life and our role in the universe.
is the placement of the Carl Sagan quotation in large bold print at the very
197. Il

198. Ied
199. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
200. The definitional analysis in Seeger was therefore statutory rather than constitutional. However, several commentators and lower courts have considered the definition in Seeger to be suggestive
also of its definition for constitutional purposes. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1981); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment: Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1381,
1425 (1967).
201. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
202. Id. Several lower courts have proposed similar definitions. In United States v. Sun Myung
Moon, 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit relied on the writings of William James to
define religion as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine." 718 F.2d at 1227
(emphasis omitted). In Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), the Third Circuit defined
religion as a belief which "addresses fundamental and ultimate questions having to do with deep and
imponderable matters" in a comprehensive manner. 662 F.2d at 1032. In Founding Church of
Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the D.C. Circuit defined religion as a
belief which embodies an underlying theory "of man's nature or his place in the Universe." 409 F.2d at
1160. Commentators have also proposed comparable definitions, suggesting such content-based formulations as "ultimate concern" and "cardinal concern." See, e.g., PAUL TmLIcH, SYsTEmArmc THEOLOGY
11-15 (Harper & Row 1967) (1951-63) (defining "ultimate concern" as "that which determines our
being or not-being").
203. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180.
204. IL at 176. Such a definition would seem to be extremely broad and could include any
strongly held philosophical belief, including, for example, Marxism. See TRIBE, supra note 171, § 14-6,
at 1182-83. However, a few years after the Seeger decision the Court, without defining "religion" or
"philosophical," seemingly limited the expanse of the Seeger definition by holding that purely philosophical beliefs are not religious:
To have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious beief.... Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and
rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would
not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than
religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). For further discussion of these issues, see TRIBE,
supra note 171, § 14-6, at 1182-83.
205. See DAvis & KENYoN, supra note 2, at vii.
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2 6
0 that compel
beginning of the book and the ominous paragraphs that follow it
merely as an
do
not
present
intelligent
design
this conclusion. The authors
important hypothesis on the nature of the world's creatures or an interesting
theory about man's development, but instead suggest that intelligent design addresses such "deep and fundamental questions" 2 0 7 as "how do mere mortals
like ourselves fit into the overall scheme of things, ' 208 "[h]ow did this immense
universe come into existence,"20 9 and "what does it all mean?" 210 By addressing these questions and postulating an intelligent agent as creator, Pandasconelse is ultimately
stitutes a belief "based on a power or being... upon which all
2 12
dependent," 2 11 the Court's definition of religion in Seeger.
In sum, regardless of whether the Court employs a content-based or functional definition of religion,2 13 the intelligent design theory of Pandas consti-

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See notes 122-123 supra and accompanying text.
DAVIs & KENYON, supra note 2, at vii.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
The authors of Pandas would presumably respond by arguing that if intelligent design meets

this definition of religion, evolution must as well, and thus evolution cannot be taught in the public
schools. After all, evolution, Pandas argues, is just an alternative belief that addresses the same fundamental questions posed by Sagan. See DAvis & KENYoN, supra note 2, at ix. The problem with this
argument is that, whereas the authors are free to present their own theories as constituting an answer to
fundamental questions, they may not validly assert without argument that other theories address such
questions. Yet, Pandas does not make the case that evolution addresses these ultimate concerns. In
fact, evolution in pure form addresses only the question of how living creatures change over time.
MONRoE E. S'

rUCKERoGE,
EVOLUlroN 598 (2d ed. 1996). It does not address the question of origins

nor does it postulate the meaning of life. It deals only with proximate causes, not ultimate ones. See
text accompanying notes 268-271 infra. Moreover, belief in evolution and belief in religion are not
mutually exclusive, as evidenced by the many generations of devout religious believers who have also
believed in evolution. See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
213. A third definition of religion, one that posits that an essential element of a religious belief is
that it be irrationally held, poses somewhat more difficult problems in evaluating Pandas,as intelligent
design is arguably a belief based on reason rather than irrational faith. Such definitions, however, have
rarely been posed. But see United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Religious belief
arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason ....It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited
by it."); Austin, supra note 172, at 3 (proposing a definition of religion based on the absence of reason).
Applying such a definition to Pandas presents two important problems. First, the Supreme Court
has never adopted an irrationality definition and has, in fact, indicated that a belief need not be irrational
for it to be religious. "[C]oncepts concerning God or a supreme being of some sort are manifestly
religious .. . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely because they are presented as a
philosophy or as a science." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 599 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1322 (D. N.J. 1977), aff 'dpercuriam, 592 F.2d 197 (3d
Cir. 1979)). Second, in order for an irrationality definition to exclude Pandas, it would have to be
formulated in a fashion that would overturn nearly all of the Court's Establishment Clause precedents.
Pandas does not prove that an intelligent designer exists; it merely suggests that there is some rational
basis upon which we might conclude that an intelligent designer created the world. However, in order
for somebody to conclude from the evidence presented in Pandas that millions of years ago an allknowing and all-powerful designer created all of nature from a master blueprint and did not allow for
any macroevolutionary change, he or she would still have to make an enormous leap, though, as Pandas
points out, not an entirely irrational one. In order for a definition of religion to exclude Pandas,therefore, it would have to stipulate that a belief be completely irrational to be religious. Since nearly all
religions (including Christianity) present at least some rational arguments for their supposed truth, an
irrationality definition of religion that excluded Pandaswould exclude most mainstream religions from
the scope of the Establishment Clause. Alternatively, a less absolute definition might declare that religious beliefs require some minimum level of irrationality and that Pandas does not meet this level.
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tutes a religious belief that may not constitutionally be taught in the public
schools.
C. Pandas Endorses Conservative Christianity
Although Pandas need do no more than promote religion generally to run
afoul of the First Amendment, the book may in fact be perceived as endorsing
conservative Christianity, an even more obvious Establishment Clause violation. The authors of Pandassuggest that because their book says nothing about
the specific beliefs "normally associated with Christian fundamentalism," 214 it
therefore does not promote or endorse Christianity.2 15 However, the contextual
inquiry the Court has consistently applied in establishment cases 2 16 reveals that
teaching Pandas would have the effect of promoting and endorsing a specific
strain of conservative Christianity-one characterized by a century-old tradition of attacking evolution.
Lawrence Tribe writes that "[w]hether a given practice constitutes a forbidden establishment [of religion] may ultimately depend on whether most people
would view it as religiously significant." 2 17 Though Tribe chooses Wallace v.
Jaffree2 18 to illustrate his point,2 19 he could have chosen any number of cases.
In Edwards and Epperson, for example, the Court looked to the historical context of the fight against evolution to determine that the Arkansas and Louisiana
legislatures acted with a religious purpose in passing their respective creationist
acts. 20 Particularly relevant are the Court's decisions in Lynch v. Donnelly22
and County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, GreaterPittsburgh
Chapter,2 in which the Court described the contours of the endorsement test.
In both of these cases, the Court considered whether a municipality's Christmas
displays constituted an establishment of religion. The endorsement test first
introduced by Justice O'Connor in her Lynch concurrence, 223 was employed by
five justices in Allegheny. 224 The essence of the test is whether a religious
practice, considering both the subjective intent of its proponents and its objecHowever, such a standard would be impossible for a court to administer and would require that the
Court inquire into the truth of a believer's religious beliefs. Such an inquiry would be in direct violation
of the Court's holding in United States v. Ballard,322 U.S. 78 (1944), that "the truth or verity of [a
person's] religious doctrines or beliefs" should not be examined. See id. at 86-88.
214. DAviS & KEN-Yon, supra note 2, at 161.
215. See id.
216. See note 154 supra and accompanying text.
217. TimF, supra note 171, § 14-6, at 1187.
218. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
219. See TRimE, supra note 171, § 14-6, at 1187. The Court in Jaffree assumed that people associate the word "prayer" with religion and consequently struck down a moment-of-silence statute that
included the word; "meditation," on the other hand, holds no religious significance for most people and
alone would not violate the Establishment Clause. See id.
220. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 590-93 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,

107-09 (1968).
221.
222.
223.
224.

465 U.S. 668 (1984).
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592.
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tive effect on its audience, 225 "sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders ... and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders."' 2 26 As Justice O'Connor argued in Lynch:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the
speaker and on the "objective" meaning of the statement in the community....
Examination of both the subjective and the objective components of the
necessary to determessage communicated by a government action is therefore
227
mine whether the action carries a forbidden meaning.
In Allegheny, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor specified the factors that the
Court must examine in determining the objective meaning of the practice.
Foremost in this inquiry is the context within which the practice is set, 228 and
this determination, in turn, depends greatly on the historical background of the
practice. 229 Although there is currently no legislative or other record from
which to determine the purpose motivating any school board or teacher seeking
to teach Pandas, 230 both the vociferous public debate accompanying adoption
of the text, exemplified by the battle in Plano, 23 1 and its instruction in the classroom would likely lead the affected students and community to perceive an
extension of the century-old Christian agenda to promote the Biblical story of
creationism at the expense of evolution.
There are many reasons why this is the case. First, and most important, the
intelligent design theory espoused by Pandasis not simply that an intelligent
cause was involved in the creation of nature, but that an intelligent designer
created organisms fully formed without allowing for macroevolutionary
change. 23 2 This is by no means a necessary characteristic of intelligent design,
which has the potential, as many devout religious believers have believed for
centuries, to be consistent with evolutionary change. Pandasteaches a particular interpretation of intelligent design, one that resembles in very important
ways the biblical story of creation literally interpreted. By making the denial of
evolution a necessary corollary of a belief in intelligent design, the authors give
away the true meaning of the text. The reasonable observer, therefore, is most
likely not going to understand Pandasas promoting a new scientific theory, but
will probably see what he or she has seen from creationists since the 1920s: an
all-out attack on evolution coupled with an argument for a creator who created
life on Earth in its present form.
Second, the authors of Pandas also attack evolution in the same manner,
employing the same arguments, language, and tone, that creationists have em225. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
226. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

227. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
228. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595-97 (Blackmun, J.).

229. See id. at 629-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Nonetheless, the purposes of the authors and publisher, as well as the Court's skepticism
towards the mouthing of secular purposes, strongly suggest that the Court would find a religious purpose in any attempt to teach the book. See text accompanying notes 112-121 supra.
231. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
232. See DAvIs & KENYON, supra note 2,at 99-100.
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233
ployed for the last century. Their claims that transitional fossils are lacking, 234
that life could not have spontaneously originated out of a prebiotic soup,
that natural selection cannot account for macroevolutionary change, 2 35 and that
random changes cannot account for great complexity236 are familiar creationist
refrains. 23 7 A reasonable observer would notice the similarity in discourse between Pandas and creationism and equate the two.
Third, the shift to intelligent design theory fits the model of periodic strategic transformation in the creationist movement that has characterized it from
the start. Like the movement to pass antievolution laws, which was followed
after Epperson by a move to pass equal time laws and then a shift to creation
science, 2 38 Pandas and the move to intelligent design bear the hallmark of the
creationist movement-trying to package and teach Christian thought in a form
that courts will allow into the schools. Like creationists in the 1920s and the
1960s,239 the authors of Pandashave chosen the secondary school textbook as
their weapon to attack evolution. Similarly, the move towards presenting intelligent design as a scientific theory echoes the creation science movement of the
1960s and 1970s, again adding to the perception of Pandasas simply an extension of traditional creationism, rather than a groundbreaking new interpretation
of scientific data. The authors' and publisher's unabashed religious purposes
can only bolster this perception. 240
Finally, the intelligent design theory of Pandas has a long history in the
development of Christian thought. Thomas Aquinas asserted the notion that the
complexity of nature lends support to a belief in God,24 1 and eighteenth century
theologian William Paley echoed this notion. 242 William Jennings Bryan, the
first and perhaps greatest leader of the creationist movement, 24 3 latched onto
the same argument. To anyone even slightly versed in Christian thought, intelligent design, particularly when infused with such conservative Christian viewpoints as a disbelief in evolution, reads not as science, but as Christianity.
Perhaps if Pandas were to have appeared out of nowhere, unaccompanied
by the hundred-plus years of the creation-evolution controversy, it might be
understood as nothing more than an attack on a widely accepted scientific theory and a proposal for an alternative explanation of natural phenomena. Instead, Pandasarrived not out of thin air, but as the product of a well-defined
history. Whether a practice constitutes an endorsement of religion depends in
large part on the historical context of that practice. 244 Pandas,burdened by its
historical associations with Christian thought, will likely be associated by an
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See id. at 93-100.
See id. at 42-55.
See id. at 69-72.
See id. at 68-69.
See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
See text accompanying notes 81-111 supra.
See text accompanying notes 71-80 supra.
See text accompanying notes 112-116 supra.
See note 48 supra.
See notes 24-30 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 53-63 supra.
See note 220 supra and accompanying text.
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everyday observer as the next chapter in a specifically Christian project. Public
school instruction of Pandas therefore threatens to send an inclusionary
message to students who share its beliefs and an exclusionary message to those
who do not. This the Establishment Clause forbids.
IV. Is PANDAS SCIENCE?

Drawing on the somewhat intuitive notion that theories can be categorized
as either science or nonscience, the authors of Pandas argue that intelligent
design is science and, as such, that its teaching withstands First Amendment
scrutiny. 245 If a bright line distinction can be drawn between science and other
fields of inquiry, the authors seem to reason, a theory that qualifies as science
cannot also be religion, 246 and therefore, teaching intelligent design is not susceptible to constitutional attack.
This argument fails for two interrelated reasons. First, the Constitution
does not require that courts allow teachers to teach science; it simply forbids
teachers from teaching religion. 247 Second, the demarcation approach to science espoused by the authors of Pandas is untenable in both theory and practice. For example, how should science be defined? What characteristics define
it? Does a theory have to possess all the characteristics or are just a few sufficient? Are courts competent to make such technical distinctions? To whom
would they look for guidance in making them? Moreover, to the extent that
courts look to philosophers of science for guidance on such issues, they should
realize that a demarcation approach toward science has been discredited in the
field for over fifty years. 248
The second insight is best considered first. The idea that scientists could
articulate criteria with which to distinguish science from nonscience was popular in the early part of the twentieth century. Perhaps the most important philosopher of science to take this position was Karl Popper, 249 who defined a true
scientific theory as one that is falsifiable. This concept laid at the center of the
philosophy of science for many years. 5 0o Essentially, Popper believed that a
true scientific theory must have observational consequences that can be falsified through experiments. 25 1 However, in the last thirty years, as philosophers
of science have grown skeptical about the adequacy of criteria such as "fal245. See DAvis & KENYON, supra note 2, at 160-61.
246. This demarcation strand of thought, commonly known as logical empiricism or logical positivism and most prominently espoused by philosopher Karl Popper, dominated the philosophy of science
for much of the twentieth century. See Richard Boyd, Confirmation, Semantics, and the Interpretation
of Scientific Theories, in Tim PHIMOSOPHY OF ScIENcE 3, 5-11 (Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J.D.
Trout eds., 1991). Both the plaintiffs in their arguments in McClean, see Ruse, supra note 105, at 16771, and Judge Overton in his decision in that case, McClean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982), adopted a demarcation approach.

247. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968). Of course, religion may be taught
from a historical or literary viewpoint if "presented objectively as part of a secular program of education." See id. at 106.

248.
249.
250.
251.

See
See
See
See

text accompanying notes 252-256 infra.
KrrcamR,supra note 105, at 37.
KARL R. POPPER, THE Looic OF Scm'mac Discov-RY 33 (1959).
KrrcHER, supra note 105, at 37-38.
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sifiability" 25 and have fallen under the influence of Thomas Kuhn's important
work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,2s 3 they have come to regard theories such as Popper's as "hopelessly flawed" 254 and have declared the entire
project of demarcation "a pseudo-problem." 25 5
In its place, many philosophers of science have turned their attention to
analyzing the features that make some scientific theories more compelling than
others. For example, Kuhn focuses not on how to distinguish science from
nonscience, but instead on how particular theories gain acceptance as paradigmatic. 256 Likewise, other philosophers of science have replaced categorical approaches to defining science with attempts to identify the criteria that make
certain theories more persuasive and helpful than others. 257 Even the Supreme
Court seemed to adopt this approach in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.258 where it replaced a bright-line "general acceptance" test for the
admission of scientific expert testimony with a series of general factors for
courts to consider in determining whether a particular theory is scientifically
valid.259 Courts should continue to follow the philosophers on this point and
realize that characterizing a theory as scientific in some sense says nothing
about whether it might also be religious or whether teaching it might endorse a
religious viewpoint in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Not surprisingly, some philosophers have argued that creation science is so
lacking in their specified characteristics that it does not qualify as a science at
all. 260 Yet courts need not open this definitional Pandora's Box. Even assum252. See id. at 42 ("[Falsifiability] either ... debars most of what we take to be science from
counting as science or it allows virtually anything to count."); see also Ruse, supra note 105, at 168
("[C]an one distinguish science from non-science? ... Simple criteria that supposedly give a clear
answer to every case-for example, Karl Popper's single stipulation of falsifiability-will not do.")
(footnote omitted).
253. THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRucruRs oF Scmin-c REvOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
254. KrrcHER, supra note 105, at 44.
255. NumBai.s, supra note 49, at xv.
256. See KUHN, supra note 253, at 1-9. Kuhn argued that new theories become paradigmatic
when they provide answers to "anomalies"-onceptual problems that have caused previous theories to
become unsatisfactory and unpersuasive in the scientific community. See id. at 77-91.
257. See, e.g., KrrcHiR,supra note 105, at 46-48 (emphasizing independent testability, unity, and
fecundity); Michael Ruse, Creation-Science Is Not Science, in CEAimONISM, SciENcE, AND Tim LAW,
supra note 105, at 150, 151-53 (pointing to explanatory power, predictive power, testability, tentativeness, and integrity).
258. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
259. See id. at 585-95. Instead of setting out a "definitive checklist or tese' for whether a certain
theory or technique is scientifically valid for purposes of FED. R. Evir. 702, the Court made some
"general observations." Id at 593. Among the factors identified as relevant are testability, peer review
and publication, rate of error, adequate control standards, and general acceptance in the scientific community. See id. at 593-94. Interestingly, one of these factors (testability) seems to rely heavily on
Popper's falsifiability criterion. The Court cited Popper for the proposition that "[t]he criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." Id. at 593 (alteration in
original) (quoting KARL PoPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFuTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF ScmNIc KNowL-

37 (5th ed. 1989)). For additional discussion of the Court's philosophy of science, see Margaret
G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology and Legal Process, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 2183 (1994); Sean O'Connor, The Supreme Court'sPhilosophy of Science: Will the Real
Karl PopperPlease Stand Up?, 35 Juemarcs J.263 (1995).
260. See KrrcHmPR, supra note 105, at 124 ("[T]he 'theory' that Creationists offer is not sufficiently like genuine science to make sense of... routine [scientific] inquiries.... People who live in
EDGE
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ing arguendo that the intelligent design theory of Pandaspossesses some scientific characteristics, 26 1 this assumption does not alleviate our Establishment
Clause concerns. The First Amendment forbids the government from establishing religion; it does not require it to teach science. Because Pandas teaches
religion, and because teaching religion in public schools violates the Establishment Clause, the Court need not determine whether the book also qualifies as
science in any nominal sense. Of course, as a policy matter, the question of
whether a particular theory is good science, bad science, or not really science at
all is quite an important question for school boards to consider when deciding
whether to teach the theory. Nevertheless, as a constitutional matter, the question of whether Pandasis science ultimately turns out not to be a very important question after all.
CONCLUSION

In recent years, growing numbers of legal academics have decried the increasing secularization of American society. 262 There is considerable doubt,
however, that these commentators have any cause to worry. As Kathleen Sullivan persuasively argues, there exist "numerous indicators of religion's lively
role in contemporary American social and political life" 263 that undermine this
Creationist houses should not throw methodological stones."); Ruse, supranote 105, at 168 ("The plaintiffs' tactic [in Mclean] was to show that creation-science is less than weak or bad science. It is not
science at all.").
261. For example, one might argue that the claims associated with Panda's core theory, such as
that animals are extremetly complex, that we will not find transitional fossils, and that we should not
expect to see new species suddenly arriving on earth are all testable, falsifiable, explanatory, and
predictive.
262. Michael McConnell argues that religion in America has been "shoved to the margins of
public life." See McConnell, supranote 151, at 127. Stephen Carter similarly asserts that the "common
rhetoric of our society refuses to accept the notion that rational, public-spirited people can take religion
seriously." STmPmN L. CARTER, THE CULTUnR
OF DISBELEF.: How ArmmcAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIViALIzE REuoious DEVOTION 6 (1993). Philip Johnson suggests that the "established religious philosophy" of modem America holds that "God is really dead and that humankind is therefore on its own."
PHILLip E. JOHNSON, REASON INTHE BALANCE: TuE CAsE ArAINST NATURALIsM IN ScIENCE, LAw &
EDUCATION 37 (1995). Moreover, Johnson believes that an important driving force behind the andreligious philosophy is the view, proffered by the scientific establishment, that evolution as fact inherently
denies the existence of God:
The issue decided in Edwards is clouded by the fact that the term creationism in newspaper
and textbook usage refers to Genesis literalism and hence to the belief that the earth is no more
than a few thousand years old. The Supreme Court opinion, however, addressed a much
broader question than the age of the earth or the validity of the Genesis account. What Justice
Brennan described as a "religious viewpoint" is the very broad proposition that a purposeful
supernatural being-God-is responsible for our existence. The leading alternative to that
belief is that purposeless material processes created us and that purpose and consciousness did
not exist in the cosmos until they evolved naturalistically. This second viewpoint is incorporated in the scientific definition of evolution, because in contemporary usage "science" is
thought to be based on a completely naturalistic understanding of reality.
Id. at 25.
263. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 195, 195-96
(1992). Sullivan has argued that the very popularity of Carter's book, including the fact that President
Clinton publicly praised it, speaks strongly against the characterization of American society which
Carter himself posits. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, God as a Lobby, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 1655, 1655 (1994)
("If the President himself publicly cites a book urging Americans to take religious devotion seriously,
how marginal can religion really be?").
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rather bleak vision of our society. Nevertheless, evolutionists have advanced a
vision of the world which necessarily marginalizes religion. Evolutionists have
argued that evolution renders religious beliefs "superfluous," 264 undermines rational belief in the existence of a supernatural
being,265 and leads "straight to a
2 66
vision which is equivalent to atheism."
This antireligious agenda is cause for great concern. The idea that evolution and religion are inherently incompatible is quite incorrect. 267 Evolutionary
theory is concerned only with how species evolve over time 2 68 and, though
incompatible with a literal reading of Genesis, it says nothing of the existence
or nonexistence of God. Even the Pope himself has recently endorsed
evolu26 9 Evolution as a theory consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church.
tionists and creationists alike err when they "perpetuate the false dilemma of
having to choose between science and religion."2 70 Stephen J. Gould makes
the point most forcefully:
To say it for... the umpteenth millionth time (from college bull sessions to
learned treatises): science simply cannot (by its legitimate methods) adjudicate
the issue of God's possible superintendence of nature. We neither affirm nor
deny it; we simply can't comment on it as scientists. If some of our crowd
have made untoward statements claiming that Darwinism disproves God, then I
will find [my third grade teacher] and have their knuckles rapped for it ....
Science can work only with naturalistic explanations; it can neither affirm nor
271
deny other types of actors (like God) in other spheres ....
An antireligious agenda is not simply misguided, it is also dangerous to
evolutionists from a legal perspective. Although it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court would ever hold that evolution is so antithetical to religion as to preclude
its teaching in public schools, 272 the Court might be forced to exclude certain
materials that expressly urge an atheistic viewpoint, 2 73 or even to require that
teachers of evolution explicitly inform their students that evolution says nothing about the reasonableness of religious beliefs. If scientists continue to urge
that evolution implies atheism, the Court might become less receptive to their
264. DAWKrNS, supra note 27, at 316.

265. See id. at 317.
266. Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y. Tiars, Dec. 2, 1995, at 8 (quoting historian of science and
evolutionist William Provine).
267. See Jeffery L. Sheler & Joannie M. Schrof, The Creation, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec.
23, 1991, at 56, 57-64 (discussing the reconciliation of religion and evolution); see also KrrcHER, supra
note 105, at 188-92 (arguing that Christianity and evolution need not conflict).
268. See Ftrrtria,supranote 101, at 10-14 (examining the nature of the conflict between evolution and creationism); see also SnRuCKBERGER, supra note 212, at 598 (defining biological evolution as
"[glenetic changes in populations of organisms through time that lead to differences among them").
269. See John Tagliabue, Pope: Evolution Not Just Hypothesis, ORANGE CouNwn REo., Oct. 25,
1996, at News 1.
270. IAN G. BAPBouR, RELIGION INAN AGE OF SCIENCE 10 (1990).
271. Gould, supra note 110, at 119.
272. See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2640 (1995) (rejecting a claim that the teaching of evolution amounts to the teaching of a
religion).
273. See B uRto, supra note 270, at 179 (arguing that public schools should not teach Dawkins'
The Blind Watchman).

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 49:439

arguments altogether, particularly those aimed at keeping "creationism" out of
the public schools.
Beyond the law, there is a more general concern. The Framers of the First
Amendment recognized the potential for societal divisiveness created by disputes over religion and wrote the Establishment Clause to prevent these disputes from becoming explosive. 274 Of course, by its very nature, the
Constitution cannot proscribe purely private conduct, and evolutionists are free
to say whatever they want outside government-sponsored forums. But the potential for divisiveness does not disappear when government steps out of religious disputes. Telling believers that their beliefs are unreasonable and
irrational can do nothing but inflame passions, increase discord, and promote
strife. Pandas,by sending a message to both atheists and non-Christians that
their views on religion are disfavored, violates both the letter and the spirit of
the Establishment Clause. However, it does not follow that since the state may
not endorse the intelligent design theory of Pandas,the theory must therefore
be irrational, untenable, or unreasonable. It is surely the case that schools
should not teach religious beliefs to students, but it is equally true that schools
should teach children, and scientists should remind themselves, that the potential for religious divisiveness does not stop when we walk out the classroom
door.

274. See Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy,supra note 263, at 197-200 ("Mhe negative
bar against establishment of religion ... was the price of ending the war of all sects against all.").

